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OF REVENUE ANTICIPATION NOTES, MINERAL RIGHTS AND MAXIMS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
In this bicentennial year of constitutional celebration and controversial
judicial nominations, fundamental questions concerning how courts should
go about the task of construing constitutions are much in the air. Such
issues of theory and method are as salient, and often as difficult and
controversial, when disputed provisions of a state constitution must be
construed as they are in the federal context.
In two "hard cases" from last term,' State Bond Commissioner v. All
Taxpayers,2 and American Lung Association, Inc. v. State Mineral Board,3
the Louisiana Supreme Court wrestled with similar issues of interpre-
tation of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. In both cases, the consti-
tutional provisions at issue operated to limit the otherwise plenary powers
of the political branches of the state government. In neither case did
the plain meaning of the provision's specific terms-"debt" in the former
case, "sold" in the latter-necessarily apply to the particular facts at
bar, nor in either case did the records of the 1973 constitutional con-
vention indicate that the framers ever considered the specific issue pre-
sented. In both cases strong arguments were raised that a broad reading
of those terms was necessary to prevent evasion of the constitution's
apparent purpose and its framers' general intentions, but in both cases
arguments of "policy"-exigent necessity in the former case, intuitive
notions of fairness in the latter-favored a contrary result. And in both
cases the court, perhaps not surprisingly, interpreted the constitution's
prohibitory terms narrowly: in the State Bond Commission case, allowing
the political branches to issue short term revenue anticipation notes
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Contrary to the epigrammatical pessimism of Lord Chief Justice Campbell and
Justice Holmes, by referring to these as "hard cases," I do not necessarily imply that
the substance of the decisions rendered constitute proverbial "bad law." Cf. Ex Parte
Long (1854) 3 W.R. 19; Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct.
436 (1904). Rather, the point is that it is hard cases such as these-cases which pit
received legal conceptions against the perceived demands of justice or public policy in a
particular instance-that often bring questions about the propriety of the court's decision
making methods most sharply into focus.
2. 510 So. 2d 662 (La. 1987).
3. 507 So. 2d 184 (La. 1987).
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without complying with the constitutional restrictions on the issuance
of state debt; and in the American Lung case, permitting them to
effectively alienate state owned mineral rights. 4
These decisions shed light on the continued propriety of reliance on
traditional "maxims" of construction for guidance in interpreting the
1974 Louisiana Constitution. In both the State Bond Commission and
Lung Association cases, the court, in the absence of definitive guidance
from the 1973 convention records, justified its decision by reliance upon
just such a traditional maxim of interpretation-that technical terms or
legal terms of art are to be interpreted in accord with their received
technical meaning.' In both cases the court justified its conclusions by
categorizing the crucial words at issue as such technical terms or words
of art, construing those terms by reference to extrinsic sources of legal
definition, and then presuming that the framers were aware of these
technical definitions and intended to incorporate them into the state
constitution.6 However appropriate it once may have been, such a tech-
nique of construction is today problematic in light of the much more
extensive evidence avilable from the convention records regarding what
the framers of the 1974 constitution actually did or did not intend and
increasing judicial recognition of the validity of reliance on "policy"
in deciding difficult cases. Indeed, in both cases, it appears that the
court's reliance on "maxims" to justify its decision functioned as but
a screen behind which the decision was actually reached on very different
grounds, grounds which could have been discussed and defended openly.
State Bond Commission
In State Bond Commission v. All Taxpayers,7 the Louisiana Supreme
Court construed article VII, section 6 of the 1974 Louisiana constitution,
which prohibits the state from incurring any "debt" unless that income
is used for specified purposes (not including ordinary operating expenses)
4. The cases are discussed infra at notes 7-27 and 28-38, respectively. In State Bond
Comm'n, the court held that article 7, section 6 of the 1974 constitution, which prohibits
the state from incurring any "debt" except through extraordinary means and for parti-
cularized purposes, did not apply to revenue anticipation notes repayable within the same
year as issued, which the state issued last summer to tide itself over an anticipated
temporary cash flow shortfall. In American Lung Ass'n, the court construed article 9,
section 4 of the 1974 constitution, which mandates that the state retain mineral rights on
any land which it has owned and then "sold," not to preclude transfer of state owned
mineral rights to private parties in the course of a good faith "compromise" of a legal
dispute over ownership of that land.
5. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 665. While the American Lung Ass'n court
was not as explicit about its analytic methods, the logic of its opinion demonstrates
reliance on the same maxim. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 22-26 and 34-35 and accompanying text.
7. 510 So. 2d 662 (La. 1987).
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and unless the issuance of that debt is approved by two-thirds majorities
in both houses of the legislature.' The court held that these constitutional
restrictions did not apply to, and thus did not prevent the state from
freely issuing, revenue anticipation notes not backed by the state's full
faith and credit and repayable within the same fiscal year as issued.
The facts of the case were not in dispute. In July 1987, the Louisiana
state treasury anticipated a cash flow shortfall that threatened to prevent
it from timely honoring all of the warrants for operating expenses that
were to come due during the coming August and September. In response
the legislature passed, by ordinary majority only, acts authorizing the
State Bond Commission to issue and sell "revenue anticipation notes"
sufficient to cover the expected temporary cash shortage. 9 The notes
thus authorized were not to exceed twenty percent of the state's antic-
ipated revenue for the remainder of the fiscal year, were not backed
by the state's full faith and credit, and were to be repaid before the
end of the fiscal year in which they were issued in preference to any
general expenditures.' 0 The Bond Commission brought a validation suit
8. La. Const. art. VII, § 6 provides:
(A) Authorization. Unless otherwise authorized by this constitution, the state
shall have no power, directly or indirectly, or through any state board, agency,
commission, or otherwise, to incur debt or issue bonds except by law enacted
by two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature. The debt
may be incurred or the bonds issued only if the funds are to be used to repel
invasion; suppress insurrection; provide relief from natural catastrophes; refund
outstanding indebtedness at the same or lower effective interest rate; or make
capital improvements, but only in accordance with a comprehensive capital
budget, which the legislature shall adopt.
(C) Full Faith and Credit. The full faith and credit of the state shall be
pledged to the repayment of all bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued
by the state directly or through any state board, agency, or commission pursuant
to the provisions of Paragraphs (A) and (B) hereof. The full faith and credit
of the state is not hereby pledged to the repayment of bonds ... which are
payable from fees, rates, rentals, tolls, charges, grants, or other receipts or
income derived by or in connection with an undertaking, facility, project, or
any combination thereof....
(D) Referendum. The legislature, by law enacted by two-thirds of the elected
members of each house, may propose a statewide public referendum to authorize
incurrence of debt for any purpose for which the legislature is not herein
authorized to incur debt.
9. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 662-64. The revenue anticipation notes were
originally authorized by 1986 La. Acts No. 28, now codified at La. R.S. 39:1410.41
(Supp. 1987) et seq. No such bonds were issued before June 30, 1987, when the statutory
authorization provided by Act 28 expired. The legislature thereafter enacted 1987 La. Acts
No. 61, which amended these provisions to extend the expiration date until June 30, 1988.
Both acts were passed by less than two-thirds majorities of the state legislature.
10. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 665. La. R.S. 39:1410.44 (limitation on
amount of notes), 1410.45 (among other things, establishing procedures for preferred
repayment of the notes), and 1410.50 (no full faith and credit) (Supp. 1987).
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and several members of the state legislature appeared as defendants,
challenging the constitutionality of the the revenue anticipation notes
and the acts by which authority they were issued."
The supreme court and the parties agreed that the determinative
issue was whether the revenue anticipation notes should be held to
constitute "debt" under the meaning of article VII, section 6. If so,
they would violate the constitution for two reasons: structurally, since
the purpose for which the money raised was to be used was not among
the limited purposes for which state debt was authorized; and proce-
durally, because the acts authorizing the notes were not passed by the
required two-thirds majority. 2 If not, no other constitutional provision
would limit the legislature's plenary power to proceed. 13
11. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 662-63. Defendants argued, among other
things, that the fact that the Bond Commission brought its action in the form of a bond
validation action indicated that the notes at issue must have been "bonds" within the meaning
of La. Const. art. VII, § 6. The supreme court brushed aside this argument, noting that
its supervisory jurisdiction is plenary, thus rendering the form of the action unimportant.
12. La. Const. art. VII, § 6, quoted supra at note 8, establishes both procedural
and substantive obstacles to the incurring of "debt" by the state. Procedurally, incurring
debt requires an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the elected membership of both houses
of the legislature, a procedural hurdle which also must be met before the state can obtain
money by referendum (La. Const. art. VII, § 6(D)), or even before the state can make
use of the small "emergency" borrowing provisions of La. Const. art. VII, § 7. The
"structural" impediment is emplaced by the language in La. Const. art. VII, § 6 limiting
the purposes for which the state can contract debt to one or another of the listed categories:
invasion, insurrection, natural catastrophe, refunding existing debt or capital improvements.
Since provision of operating capital to cover cash flow shortages is not one of the
designated purposes, the consequencce of a decision by the court that the notes at issue
were "debt" would be to disable any majority of the legislature, no matter how large,
from acting directly in any manner to resolve the state's cash crunch.
Even were the legislature thus structurally disabled from acting directly, however, the
state might not have been totally without recourse in the face of a temporary cash
shortage. If the shortage could be fairly construed as "an event or occurrence not
reasonably anticipated by the legislature," a small sum could have been borrowed through
the Interim Emergency Board, as authorized by La. Const. art. VII, § 7. But see infra
note 18. Alternatively the voters could by referendum authorize state debt in any amount,
for any legitimate governmental purpose, including covering governmental cash shortages.
La. Const. art. VII, § 6(D), quoted supra at note 8. However, the time it would take
to set up such a referendum might render this mechanism unwieldy as a way of dealing
with short term needs for operating capital.
13. See infra note 42; State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 664-65. Defendants also
argued that, since La. Const. art. VII, § 6 prohibits state debt except as therein provided
or "[u]nless otherwise authorized by this constitution," the proponents of the revenue
anticipation notes' constitutionality should be required to demonstrate that they were
"authorized" by some constitutional provision. However, as the supreme court correctly
noted, a fundamental of state constitutional interpretation is that the legislature enjoys
plenary authority to do all things not explicitly forbidden by the constitution. It is up
to the opponents of legislative action to show that those acts are forbidden. If revenue
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Defendants argued that an intention of the drafters of the 1974
constitution to prohibit the state from issuing short term notes of this
type could be inferred from the convention records. Defendants drew
that inference primarily from three factors. First, article VII of the 1974
constitution, of which section 6 formed a part, is an integrated whole,
the evident overall intent of which was to limit the state's ability to
contract debt. According to defendants, that article provided other means
by which short term financial emergencies could be met, and to permit
even short term obligations to be contracted by less than a two-thirds
vote would radically weaken the safeguards against fiscal mismanagement
which the framers wanted in place. 14 Second, the debates at the con-
vention reveal that the intent of the committee which drafted the initial
version of the article on government finance was to require all future
state debt to be backed by the state's full faith and credit, thereby
securing lower interest rates. The only exception introduced by the full
convention into this plan was the express provision for revenue bonds
made in paragraph (C) of section 6.'1 Defendants argued that this ex-
ception should be regarded as exclusive and that no other forms of
indebtedness lacking the full backing of the state should be permitted.
Finally, defendants noted that the Projet of a Constitution for the State
of Louisiana (1954) [hereinafter "Projet"], a basic convention reference
which was distributed to all delegates and convention staff and served
as a source from which they worked, contained language expressly
permitting the state to issue short term notes to cover cash flow shortfalls.16
anticipation notes are indeed not "debt," no other constitutional provision would be
applicable to prohibit their issuance. In any event, though the court did not rely on it,
the records of the 1973 constitutional convention indicate that the "unless otherwise
authorized" language on which defendants relied was put into section 6 primarily for
another purpose: to ensure that the Interim Emergency Board could borrow small amounts
in emergencies, subject to legislative approval. 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973, Convention Transcripts at 2801 (remarks of Delegate Brown) [here-
inafter Records].
14. The integrated constitutional scheme for controlling state indebtedness includes
the balanced budget requirement of La. Const. art. VII, § 10(B), the centralization of
authority in the State Treasury and the State Bond Commission (sections 8 and 9),
requiring budgets, including a comprehensive capital budget (sections 6(B) and 11), the
strict limits on state borrowing at issue here, and the referendum and emergency borrowing
provisions of sections 6(D) and 7.
15. 9 Records, supra note 13, at 3366-71.
16. The Projet was drafted by the Louisiana Law Institute pursuant to legislative
mandate, well before the 1973 convention was called. Its proposed section governing state
debt, Projet art. IV, § 9, included among the purposes for which state debt could be
incurred, in addition to those found in the 1974 constitution, debt instruments intended
"to meet appropriations of any fiscal year in anticipation of the collection of the revenues
of such year and to be repaid within one year...." 2 Louisiana Law Institute, Projet
of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana, 345 (1954). The Projet's survey of sister
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Defendants argued that the failure of the drafting committee or full
convention to include similar language in the constitution should be
interpreted as an implied rejection of such authority.
These arguments have considerable force in that they demonstrate
the overall purposes of the delegates to limit and control state indebt-
edness-purposes which would be furthered if the constitutional restric-
tions on state "debt" were broadly construed.17 Nevertheless, they do
not demonstrate that the framers ever explicitly considered, much less
consciously rejected, the proposition that the legislature might remain
authorized to issue revenue anticipation notes of the type at bar in State
Bond Commission. Both the argument from the integrated nature of
article VII and that from the express provisions governing revenue bonds
somewhat beg this question. Demonstration that an integrated scheme
for dealing with a certain class of questions is in place does not in
itself provide much assistance in distinguishing those particular instances
which fall within that scheme from those which do not. While section
7 of article VII does provide an alternative "emergency" mechanism
for raising needed capital for the state, it is not obvious that that
mechanism was intended or would be adequate to tide the state over
forseeable periods of cash flow shortage. 8 And neither the convention's
admitted concern to control bonding by generally requiring legislative
state's constitutions also led to the observation that, generally, provision is made for short
term borrowing to cover "casual deficits," and that Louisiana is said to have handled
this problem by the predecessor of present article 7, section 7. Projet Vol. 1, Part 2 at
1131.
17. Revenue anticipation notes, if used to systematically evade the constitutional
restraints on debt, could potentially lead the state into financial difficulties. Compare
Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Lim-
itations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt,
and Beyond, 63 Minn.L. Rev. 545, 559-69 (1979), detailing how New York City's misuse
of revenue anticipation notes led in large part to its financial crisis. Louisiana's time to
pay the piper may come at the end of the coming fiscal year if the anticipated revenues
fail to materialize in the amounts hoped for. The notes, with first call on revenues, will
be paid: But the state may then again lack sufficient operating funds. The unfortunate
difference will be that, at the end of the fiscal year, it will be unable to repeat this
process of short term borrowing and may then face a belt tightening all the more drastic
for having been put off.
18. Though the "emergency borrowing" provisions of La. Const. art. VII, § 7 might
have provided an alternative escape for the state from its cash flow crunch, two factors
make it unlikely that reliance on that section would be effective. First, paragraph (B) of
the section makes plain that, for purposes of triggering this borrowing provision, "an
emergency is an event or occurrence not reasonably anticipated by the legislature." Since
the state's cash shortage may well have been predictable, this provision might not apply.
Moreover, paragraph (C) of section 7 severely limits the total amount of outstanding
"emergency" indebtedness at any time to one tenth of one percent of the total state
receipts for the preceding fiscal year. It may be doubtful that such an amount would be
sufficient to sustain the government's operations until the anticipated revenue materializes.
[Vol. 48
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supermajorities nor their equally clear desire to lower the interest rates
on state obligations by generally mandating use of the state's full faith
and credit proves that short term state obligations were necessarily
intended to be subject to these constraints. Indeed, since such short
term revenue anticipation notes do not involve very large total interest
burdens regardless of the rate charged, and since they do not in any
event burden future generations, an argument could be made that the
constitutional limitations applied to long term state debt are quite un-
necessary in this context. Some evidence exists that at least certain
delegates to the constitutional convention had in mind just such a
functional distinction between long and short term debt when section 6
was adopted.' 9
Finally, the inference which defendants sought to draw from the
convention's failure to adopt the Projet's explicit authorization of short
term revenue anticipation notes is also less than dispositive. The con-
vention's Subcommittee on Public Finance, which drafted the original
version of section 6, never explicitly considered the Projet language.
Rather, it based its deliberations on a draft article on revenue and
finance provided by the subcommittee's research staff. 20 Unlike the Pro-
jet, that draft contained no reference to casual debt or revenue antic-
ipation notes, nor did the proposed article which the subcommittee
presented to the convention. 21 Thus, while the delegates had in their
possession materials from which this problem could have been consid-
ered, the convention records do not demonstrate that it was ever in fact
specifically considered or that revenue anticipation notes were rejected
by the drafting committee or the full convention.
But, in concluding that the revenue anticipation notes did not con-
stitute "debt" in the constitutional meaning of that term, the Louisiana
Supreme Court did not delve into questions of interpretation of the
convention records or any other direct evidence of the drafters' intentions
or lack thereof.2 2 Rather, the court relied primarily on the traditional
19. E.g., 9 Records, supra note 13, at 3320 (remarks of Delegate (now Governor-elect)
Roemer equating "bonds" with "obligations of the future generations of this state. .. ")
20. 12 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Committee Doc-
uments (1977), Subcommittee on Public Finance at 500-02.
21. Id. The draft from which the subcommittee worked would have permitted state
debt in language similar to that eventually ratified in La. Const. art. VII, § 6: "to repel
invasion; suppress insurrection; provide relief from natural catastrophes; refund outstanding
indebtedness if it is in the best interest of the state; or make capital improvements."
Unlike the Projet version, neither that draft nor any other actually considered by the
subcommittee or the full convention contained any clear reference to revenue anticipation
notes or casual deficits.
22. The court's only reference to direct evidence of the drafters' intentions was its
single dismissive assertion that "[a] review of constitution records reflects" no intent to
explicitly prohibit revenue anticipation notes. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 510
So. 2d 662, 666 (La. 1987.
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axiom that, because the word "debt" allegedly constitutes a "term of
art or technical term," it therefore must be "interpreted according to
its received meaning and acceptation with those learned in the field of
governmental finance." ' 23 Recognizing that this "term of art" had never
been construed by Louisiana courts, the supreme court sought its "re-
ceived meaning" by citation to a number of cases from other jurisdictions
which construed similar provisions of other state constitutions so as not
to restrict their respective legislatures' authority to issue short term
revenue anticipation notes. 24 Despite the absence of direct evidence that
this foreign jurisprudence was ever considered by the framers, the court
argued that, since many of the cited authorities predated the 1973
convention, the technical distinctions they drew "may be presumed at-
tendant to the consideration of our constitutional convention delegates
23. Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 15.) With or without overt citation to the civil
code or other source of such maxims of construction, the Louisiana courts frequently
define legal terms as did the court in State Bond Comm'n, by finding or assuming that
they are technical terms of art and referring to extrinsic bodies of law in which those
terms have obtained a fixed technical meaning. Compare, New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402, 412 (La. 1982) (determining whether a scheme
of compensation for firefighters constituted a "minimum wage law" by looking to jur-
isprudence under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act). It is interesting to note that
while Thomas Cooley, one of the leading scholars of the last century and a proponent of
many of the traditional maxims of constitutional construction, recognized this principle
of interpretation, he did not derive it from any argument concerning the inherent meaning
of language. Rather, he defended the technical meaning of legal terms of art as a practical
safeguard of liberty:
But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions, that in many
particulars they are but the legitimate successors of the great charters of English
liberty, whose provisions declaratory of the rights of the subject have acquired
a well-understood meaning, which the people must be supposed to have had in
view in adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless we un-
derstand their history; and when we find them expressed in technical words,
and words of art, we must suppose these words to be employed in their technical
sense .... The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood,
because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history
where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights.
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union 73 (4th ed. 1878).
24. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 665. The cases cited, including State ex. rel.
La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983); Boneno v. North Carolina,
54 N.C. App. 690, 284 S.E.2d 170 (1981); Schmoldt v. Bolen, 183 Oki. 191, 80 P.2d
609 (1938); and Kelley v. Baldwin, 319 Pa. 53, 179 A. 736 (1935), are representative of
a substantial body of law from many states distinguishing on functional grounds between
long term state debt and short term anticipation of levied but uncollected revenues. Such
reliance on sister states' jurisprudence to construe similar "technical" provisions in the
Louisiana constitution is far from unprecedented. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kemp v. Baton
Rouge, 215 La. 315, 323-29, 40 So. 2d 477, 480-81 (1949), in which the court relied on
a legal encyclopedia and decisions from other states to determine the constitutionality of
an amendment making several changes in the Plan of Government of Baton Rouge.
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who drafted Article VII, sec. 6." ' 25 Finally, in the last paragraph of the
opinion, the court further supported its "presumed intent" argument
by drawing a functional distinction between obligations which, because
they pledge the state to make repayments in future years, burden future
legislatures and taxpayers, and other obligations (analogous to ordinary
warrants for expenditures) which simply indicate how the state has chosen
to spend its funds in a particular year. 26
What is remarkable about the court's analysis is what does not
appear. The court in State Bond Commission undertook no detailed
analysis of what the convention records showed or of the consequences
for interpretation of the delegates' apparent failure to consider the issue
presented. Nor did the court overtly discuss the competing policy con-
siderations-the conflict between the temporary disruption of government
functions likely to ensue if the revenue anticipation notes were disallowed
and the longer term danger posed by permitting a financing mechanism
free of constitutional control- 27which underlay its decision. Instead, the
court relied upon a naked assertion that "debt" constituted a term of
art and a traditional axiom of construction, that the framers will be
assumed to have intended such terms in their technical sense. It hy-
pothesized a fictional "intention" on the part of the drafters, an "as-
sumed" purpose to freely permit the legislature to issue revenue
anticipation notes without satisfying the constitutional safeguards im-
posed on the creation of all other state debt. Since the direct evidence
suggests that the assumed intention is indeed no more than a fiction,
the relationship between the court's rationale and its result is tenuous
at best.
American Lung Association
In American Lung Association v. State Mineral Board,2s the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court interpreted article IX, section 4 of the 1974
25. State Bond Comm'n, 510 So. 2d at 665. The court also argued that, since article
VII, section 6(A) of the 1974 constitution essentially repeated in language and intent
former article IV, section 2 of the 1921 constitution, the presumption that the framers
intended to incorporate the foriegn state jurisprudence construing constitutional limitations
on state debt is strengthened. If the framers had intended to avoid this judicial gloss,
they could have done so explicitly; their failure to do so therefore reflects acceptance,
or so the argument goes. Id. at 665-66. This argument however also depends upon the
assumption that the framers were, or should be presumed to have been, aware that such
a gloss had been placed on provisions of the type they reenacted. And it is the validity
of that presumption, in light of the evidence of the convention records that the subject
never came up, that is in issue.
26. Id. at 666. Compare supra note 19.
27. See supra note 17.
28. 507 So. 2d 184 (La. 1987).
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constitution, which mandates reservation to the state of mineral rights
on all land "sold" by the state, not to apply to land alienated by the
state in the course of a good faith compromise of a legal dispute over
title.2 9
As with the State Bond Commission case, the facts in American
Lung Association were not in dispute. The land at issue was originally
donated to the state in 1924 by the Lung Association's predecessor,
without reservation.30 In 1975, after the state had largely ceased to use
the donated tract for its original charitable purpose, the Lung Association
brought an action for revocation. That suit was settled by an apparently
fair and good faith compromise dividing the disputed land between the
Association and the state; each promising to cede to the other whatever
rights it may have had in the other's portion and each executing ap-
propriate documents to effectuate that compromise and exchange, again
without any express mention of mineral rights. A few years later, the
state Mineral Board laid claim to the mineral rights on that portion of
the original tract which it had ceded to the Lung Association. The
district court held for the Board and the court of appeal affirmed,
holding that precedent and public policy required that section 4 be
broadly construed to preclude any "alienation" of state-owned mineral
rights by any means, including the compromise and exchange between
the Lung Association and the state.3
The supreme court reversed, holding that the constitutional mandate
did not, in these circumstances, prevent the Lung Association from
regaining mineral rights on its compromise portion of the original dis-
puted tract. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal that
important principles of public interest and a solid line of cases and
academic authority precluded limiting the term "sold" in section 4 to
29. La. Const. art. IX, § 4 provides:
(A) Reservation of Mineral Rights. The mineral rights on property sold by
the state shall be reserved, except when the owner or person having the right
to redeem buys or redeems property sold or adjudicated to the state for taxes.
(B) Prescription. Lands and mineral interests of the state, of a school board,
or of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription.
30. At the time of the original donation of the disputed land to the state, the state's
power to sell state owned mineral rights was governed by the predecessor of the present
provision, article IV, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. That section provided,
in pertinent part: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all property sold by the
State shall be reserved, except where the owner or other person having the right to redeem
may buy or redeem property sold or adjudicated to the State for taxes." La. Const. art.
IV, § 2 (1921).
31. American Lung Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 184-87. The circuit court's opinion is reported
at American Lung Ass'n v. State Mineral Bd., 490 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 507 So. 2d 184 (1987).
[Vol. 48
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any narrow or technical definition.32 Rather, the supreme court agreed
that the constitutional mandate should be construed to reach any func-
tional equivalent of a sale, "probably" including "conveyance of mineral
rights to the state through a simple exchange of property."
3
Nevertheless, the American Lung Association court refused to extend
this rationale to the facts of the case before it. Instead, the court defined
the essence of the transaction between the state and the Lung Association
as a "compromise" rather than an exchange of property, and relied on
technical distinctions drawn in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
and Planiol's Treatise on the Civil Law to conclude that a "compromise"
ending a lawsuit is, in the civilian tradition, "something entirely different
from a sale, and from an exchange." ' 34 The crucial technical distinction,
according to the court and the civilian authorities, is between transactions
which confer "new rights" and, compromises which merely involve rec-
ognition of part or all of the other party's pre-existing right or claim.
Thus, the court held, the constitutional prohibition on transfer of mineral
rights when the state "sells" land does not apply to transactions in
which the state "compromises" land away. 5 As nineteenth century French
32. Prior cases have read the mineral rights reservation clauses broadly to prohibit
loss of state owned mineral rights by acquisitive prescription, Shell Oil Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 336 So. 2d 248, 254 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 1156 (1976),
as well as to mandate reservation of mineral rights in land sold by state agencies such
as levee districts. 336 So. 2d at 253; Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 1047, 156 So. 2d 431,
434 (1963). Moreover, though the language used may have been broader than necessary
to support their respective holdings, cases construing article IX, section 4 or its 1921
predecessor, as well as scholarly commentators, had fallen into the habit of regularly
restating that the Louisiana Constitution mandated reservation of mineral rights on any
land "alienated" by the state, apparently regardless of the mechanism by which that
alienation took place. Board of Comm'rs v. S.D. Hunter Foundation, 354 So. 2d 156,
169 n.8 (La. 1977); Shell Oil Co., 336 So. 2d at 254; Lewis, 244 La. at 1047, 156 So.
2d at 434; American Lung Ass'n, 490 So. 2d at 347-48, and scholarly articles cited therein.
These broad interpretations of the mineral reservation provisions reflect the strong public
purpose which courts and commentators see the provision as furthering. King v. Board
of Comm'rs, 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (the purpose is to prevent plundering
of state assets by insiders to the detriment of the people generally); Note, Mineral Rights-
Alienation of Minerals by State Political Subdivisions and Agencies, 21 La. L. Rev. 271
(1960) (these provisions are needed to preserve state assets for the benefit of future
generations).
33. American Lung Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 189.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 189-91. It appears that the transaction between the state and the Lung
Association was in essence a "compromise" as that term is defined in La. Civ. Code
art. 3071. However, in Louisiana law the essential nature of a compromise appears to
focus more on reciprocal concessions and the intent to end litigation, rather than on the
distinction between new rights and recognition of pre-existing claims, for which the court
cited Planiol. Compare 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations, §§ 372-76 at 636 and §§ 388-93 at
654 in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969), with 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil
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civil law commentators are not inherently relevant to problems of twen-
tieth century constitutional interpretation, the court must be understood
to be implying that the drafters of the 1974 constitution were or should
have been aware of the the technical distinctions drawn by the civil
code and Planiol between "compromises" and "sales," and that the
court can validly assume that when the delegates drafted section 4 they
chose the term "sold" advisedly, intending thereby to incorporate that
distinction.
To be sure, a strong equitable case could be made in favor of the
Lung Association. It is a charity, the land at issue was originally given
to rather than purchased by the state, the state was in some sense
reneging on its own free agreement to give back part of what the charity
had given it, and the state legislature had indicated its desire to see the
Lung Association prevail.36 But the logic of the court's conceptual distinc-
tion between compromises and all other procedures by which land can
be alienated is subject to criticism. From the time the Lung Association's
predecessor gave the land to the state until at least 1975 when the Lung
Association commenced its revocation action, the state held absolute title
to the entire disputed tract. In 1974, the Lung Association had no owner-
ship interest in that property, regardless of the potential merits of the
Lung Association's future claim for revocation. Since the Lung Association
Law no. 2295 at 318 (La. St. L. Inst. Trans. 11th ed. 1959) (relied upon by the court).
In any event, in the passage relied upon by the court, Planiol appears to be discussing
not revocation of a donation but the very different circumstances of a case where the
parties assert competing titles to ownership of the same property. In a case of that type
it may well be that each party to a compromise receives no "new rights" from the other;
each rather obtains only recognition of real rights that the party asserted all along. Here,
in contrast, the Lung Association's only "right" prior to 1975 was its power to force
the state to use the gift for its charitable purpose. See infra note 37.
36. In 1984 La. Acts No. 959 the legislature directed the state Office of Lands and
Natural Resources to release and quitclaim all interest the state might have in the Lung
Association's compromise portion of the tract to the Lung Association. By Concurrent
Resolution No. 77, the legislature authorized the instigation and continuation of the Lung
Association's suit against the state. Though neither of these legislative pronouncements
affected the outcome of the case, American Lung Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 186-87, they do
indicate where the legislature's sympathies lay.
37. At the time of the donation, full title to the entire disputed tract passed to the
state. La. Civ. Code, art. 1468. The Lung Association had a right to condition that
gift on the fulfillment of the conditions, and to revoke the donation if those conditions
did not continue to be met, La. Civ. Code art. 1568. But the Association's ability to
insist on performance of the condition-here that the land continue to be used for its
original charitable purpose-was at most a personal right rather than a real right in the
property. Thus the real rights in its compromise portion which the Lung Association
today enjoys are "new" in that they are distinct from any "right" it had prior to 1975.
See A. Yiannopoulos, Property §§ 132, 134, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.
1989), distinguishing real and personal rights.
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now possesses, as a result of the parties' transaction, some real and mineral
rights to which it had no title in 1974, it appears that, contrary to the
court's assertion, somewhere along the line the transactions between the
state and the Lung Association did result in the creation of 'new rights"
in the Association at the expense of the state. Moreover, the court's
ruling in this case eventually may come to be seen as questionable social
policy. Though the court attempted to limit the force of its holding to
"good faith" compromises of competing property claims,3" this new
loophole in what previously had been a nearly absolute preclusion of
divestment of state owned mineral resources may in the future become
the source of shady deals or at least difficult litigations necessary to
separate the "bona fide" from the less so.
But again what is striking is that the analytic technique used in this
case is equivalent to that in State Bond Commission. Though not as
explicit about its methodology as it was in that case, the court in
American Lung Association likewise proceeded by treating the crucial
terms, here "sale" and "compromise," as technical concepts, and then
applying the traditional maxim that such terms are presumed to have
been intended by the the framers to be understood in their technical
sense. As in State Bond Commission, the American Lung Association
court made no apparent attempt to determine from the convention
records whether the delegates had any actual intent as to the issue
presented, if so what that intention might have been, or if not what
the analytical consequences of their failure to consider the question
might be. (As in State Bond Commission, the convention records indicate
that while the delegates clearly intended that the prohibition on sale of
state mineral rights should apply broadly, there is no indication that
they ever considered the issue of whether compromises should be an
exception to the general prohibition. 9) Nor did the court openly discuss
the competing policy considerations underlying its decision. Instead the
court once again used formal axioms to guide it reasoning, constructing
a "fictitious intent" that did not exist in fact, and construing the
constitution accordingly.
38. American Lung Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 191.
39. As originally presented to the convention by its drafting committee, the present
article IX, section 4 merely restated the prior law. 9 Records, supra note 13 at 2942 (remarks
of Delegate Lambert). That initial draft was then successively amended into its present
form by adding language now comprising present paragraph (B) of that section, which
prohibits loss through prescription of mineral rights belonging to the state or its organs.
The evident purpose of this amendment was to maximize the constitutional protection of
state mineral assots. Id. at 2942-43 (remarks of Delegate Shannon), 2944 (remarks of
Delegate Burson). There is no indication that the delegates discussed or considered whether
any particular types of transactions, by compromise or any other methods, would or
should provide a mechanism by which the state could nevertheless divest itself of mineral
rights.
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As in State Bond Commission, the question is whether such tech-
niques remain appropriate in light of the availability of evidence from
which the framers' intentions or lack thereof can be better estimated,
and the growing recognition by courts in this state that, where inter-
pretation is not in fact constrained by a draftsman's intentions, the
court may openly base its decision upon criteria of justice and sound
public policy.
Techniques Of Constitutional Interpretation: Of Maxims, Records,
Justice and Framers' Intent
Curren( debate concerning how constitutions should be interpreted
has taken place almost exclusively with reference to the United States
Constitution, not state constitutions. When theorists of "originalist"
interpretation do academic battle with their "non-originalist" foes, when
textualists struggle with intentionalists and when metaphysical strife rages
over the level of abstraction at which constitutions should be read, the
protagonists almost invariably speak of the Federal Constitution alone. °
40. A good general summary of the various types of theories of constitutional inter-
pretation can be found in Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980), from where the terminology used in this article is taken.
Briefly, "originalist" approaches to constitutional interpretation seek to discern the
meaning which the constitutional language may have had for those who drafted and
ratified it. Various practitioners of the art differ as to whether they would give primacy
to the text of the document or to historical evidences of the framers' intentions, and as
to the level of abstraction at which they are willing to interpret certain "open ended"
language within the Federal Constitution. But all share a fundamental perception that the
historical acts by which the framers drafted and the people ratified the Constitution give
their understanding of the document at the time of adoption a political and philosophical
legitimacy which later courts are not authorized to alter. See, e.g., T. Cooley, A Treatise
on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States
of the American Union 68-70 (4th ed. 1874); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review 1-9 (1980).
Non-originalist approaches, in contrast, start from the equally valid premise that each
generation gives its consent to the constitutional scheme according to its own understanding
of what that document means. Such an approach typically sees the meaning of the text
evolving over time in response to the needs of the time. In such theories, courts in effect
act in dialectical partnership with the political branches and the populace to articulate
that evolving understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perry, Noninterpretive Review
in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 278 (1981); Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975). Prominent examples
of judicial decisions under the Federal Constitution which have been described as essentially
non-originalist in method include Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct.
686 (1954), in which the Court read into the fourteenth amendment a prohibition of the
system of segregation which most of that amendment's framers and ratifiers apparently
found acceptable (see, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955)) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), in
which the Court relied upon evolving concepts of personal privacy arguably rooted in
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This is unfortunate since similar issues regarding constitutional inter-
pretation-whether and how closely a court should be bound to the
legal conceptions entertained by the framers, how to determine whether
the framers ever considered particular problems and how to discern their
intentions if they did-recur in state constitutional cases as well.
Despite this relative lack of articulated theory with respect to state
constitutions, it appears generally safe to assume that arguments favoring
fidelity to the "original intentions" of the drafters, although developed
with reference to the Federal Constitution, should apply even more
strongly to state constitutions. To be sure, most state constitutions differ
markedly in form and function from their federal counterpart. Theories
of interpretation developed with regard to a short, difficult to alter
document written two hundred years ago to grant limited powers to a
new government may well not be directly transferable to recent, detailed,
readily altered state constitutions such as Louisiana's. But to the extent
that such differences exist, they appear to favor an even greater reliance
on originalist modes of construction for state constitutions. Since the
Louisiana Constitution was drafted only a relatively few years ago,
interpretation of its language or its framers' beliefs is not hampered by
changes over time in the meaning of terms or by changing social and
political realities. Moreover, much better evidence is available from which
the intentions of drafters of the state's constitution can be discerned.
Unlike the delegates to Philadelphia, the drafters of the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution left an extensive record of their debates and of the process
by which specific provisions were written and rewritten into their final
form; objections that the framers' intent (i.e., whether or not they had
any intent as to a particular question, and if so what it was) cannot
be discovered are far less persuasive here than for the Federal Consti-
tution.4 1 Since the state constitution is more readily amended by the
legislature and voters, there is less need for the courts to take it upon
themselves to adapt the document to changing times. And since state
constitutions are typically far longer, more detailed and "statute-like"
than is the United States Constitution-relatively less concerned with
protecting fundamental rights or safeguarding the democratic process,
and more devoted to enshrining particular policies and detailing gov-
but not directly stated in the constitutional text to limit state control of abortions.
Differing 'levels of abstraction" refers to the differing extent to which the constitutional
interpreter conceives himself entitled to abstract from a particular provision certain un-
derlying philosophical principles or concepts which can then be applied in ways that the
framers never conceived, or even in ways that would produce particular results which the
framers 'might have opposed. See, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 133-37 (1977).
1 .41: See Hargrave, Work of the Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 36 La. L. Rev. 533, 533-35 (1976), discussing the use of convention
records in reference to Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
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ernment operations-it makes sense to construe them with more regard
for their drafters' particular purposes and perhaps with less concern for
natural law, grand issues of fundamental justice or other philosophical
verities. 4
2
The Louisiana Supreme Court has tended to justify its results in
particular cases and express itself concerning how the state constitution
should be interpreted without reference to such overtly philosophical
considerations. Rather, the court has relied on a number of standard
axioms of constitutional construction, a tool kit of formal rules which
can be applied to yield results when the constitution's language and
intent are unclear. Among the most frequently repeated are: that the state's
political branches retain plenary authority to do all things not expressly
forbidden by the constitution;4 3 that constitutional provisions are to be in-
terpreted by the same rules as ordinary statutes;" that construction should
give effect to the provision's purpose as indicated by "a fair interpre-
42. Though the 1974 Louisiana Constitution is much shorter and less "statutory"
than its 1921 predecessor, it remains far longer and more specific in its provisions than
the Federal Constitution. Of course, different types of constitutional provisions may well
be interpreted at differing levels of abstraction. Guarantees of fundamental rights phrased
in very general terms (e.g., the guarantees of "equal protection of the laws" or against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" in the Federal Constitution, or the guarantee of
"privacy" in article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution) appear to call for inter-
pretation at a relatively high level of abstraction. These guarantees embody general prin-
ciples regarding the proper relationship between man and state that, if they are to be
effective at all, must be protected from novel unanticipated threats as well as against the
specific evils which the framers had in mind. Thus there is little debate that, for example,
the federal fourth amendment applies to limit government wiretapping, although such
possibilities were unknown to the framers.
On the other hand, constitutional provisions which set out detailed regulatory schemes,
such as, for example, article X of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution regulating the state's
civil service system, appear to be properly interpreted at a relatively low level of abstraction,
at least in most circumstances. They typically embody specific rules rather than general
principles, and too freehanded an approach by judges may well upset carefully chosen
and balanced systems and compromises.
The provisions at issue in the cases discussed here appear to fall somewhere between
these extremes, but closer to the latter. Cf. Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology
in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U.L. Rev. 147, 148 (1981) (noting that statutes vary along
this same range, from narrow precept to general principle and should be interpreted
accordingly).
43. This is probably the most consistently repeated maxim in the supreme court's
armamentarium. E.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.
2d 281, 286 (La. 1986); Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 706 (La. 1983); New Orleans
Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402, 406 (La. 1982); Board of
Secondary and Elementary Educ. v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147, 153 (La. 1977).
44. E.g., Aguillard, 440 So. 2d 704, 707 (La. 1983); Jones -.. LaBarbera, 342 So.
2d 1125, 1127 (La. 1977); Barnett v. Deville, 289 So. 2d 129, 146 (La. 1974); Roberts
v. Baton Rouge, 236 La. 521, 558-59 n.9, 108 So. 2d 111, 124 n.9 (1958); State ex rel.
Kemp v. Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 343, 40 So. 2d 477, 486 (1949).
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tation of the words used";" that "unambiguous" language precludes resort
to any other method of construction;" that despite the foregoing, the posi-
tion, drafting history and development of particular provisions, and the par-
ticular evils which constitutional provisions sought to correct, can all
be legitimate sources of interpretation; 1 and that where dispute centers on
a technical term or legal term of art, resort may be had to extrinsic
sources of law and construction of similar provisions in other states'
constitutions .4
Considered only as formal axioms, these pronouncements seem no-
tably unlikely to yield determinate results in particular cases. To state
that the legislature's authority is plenary unless constrained by the state
constitution gives little guide to determining how broadly or narrowly
those constraints will be interpreted, or what counts as evidence that a
particular prohibition was intended. The analogy, to statutory construc-
tion is also largely devoid of analytic content and is often used as no
more than an introductory flourish prior to citation of and reliance on
one or another of the civil code articles on construction-articles which
themselves are not substantially different than the axioms of constitu-
tional construction on which the courts rely independently of any such
citation. 49 Similarly, "unambiguous" language and the "fair interpre-
tation of the words used" are elusive beasts easy to postulate but difficult
to identify in practice. As numerous dissents demonstrate, both concepts
45. Board of Comm'rs, 496 So. 2d at 298; State ex rel. Guste v. Board of Comm'rs,
456 So. 2d 605, 609 (La. 1984); Barnett, 289 So. 2d at 146.
46. State ex rel. Guste 456 So. 2d at 609; Aguillard, 440 So. 2d at 707; Bank of
New Orleans and Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So. 2d 354, 356 (La. 1980); West v. Allen,
375 So. 2d 758, 759-60 (La. 1979); City of Baton Rouge v. Short, 345 So. 2d 37, 40
(La. 1977); Public Hous. Admin. v. Housing Auth., 242 La. 519, 531-32, 137 So. 2d
315, 320 (1962).
47. Board of Comm'rs, 496 So. 2d at 287-88 (looking to the overall structure of the
1974 constitution, the nature of the evil sought to be addressed and the records of the
convention); New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n, 422 So. 2d at 407-09 (reliance on convention
records); Board of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 347 So. 2d at 150-51 (looking to
history and development of disputed provision); Jones, 342 So. 2d at 1127 (looking to
"the nature and object of the provision under consideration with all the light and aid
of contemporaneous history"); Barnett, 289 So. 2d at 146 (structure, history and com-
parison with other provisions of the constitution); Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115
So. 2d 373 (1959) (comparing different constitutional provisions).
48. E.g., State ex rel. Kemp v. Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So. 2d 477, 480-81
(1949) (looking to decisions on similar provisions from other states).
49. E.g., State ex rel. Guste, 456 So. 2d at 609; Roberts v. Baton Rouge, 236 La.
521, 558-59 & n.9, 108 So. 2d 111, 124 & n.9 (1958). Compare the maxims listed in,
for example, Barnett, 289 So. 2d at 146 with articles 13 through 21 of the civil code
regarding statutory construction and with the maxims of construction discussed in T.
Cooley, supra note 40, at 48-86.
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seem to reside primarily in the eye of the beholder. 0 And to authorize
resort to surrounding or contrasting provisions within the constitutional
text, to drafting history or to extrinsic sources of interpretation gives
little guidance as to how a court should choose among these various
guides when, as is often the case, they tend toward differing conclusions.
Although these heterogenous maxims might give the impression of
being no more than a body of alternative rationales that can be trotted
out when needed to justify results, they do share an essential unity of
focus. Fairly employed, each attempts to direct the court's attention to
one or another source of indirect evidence concerning the meaning which
the provision's drafters wanted to convey. The "plain meaning" of
ordinary language or commonly understood meanings of legal terms of
art, drafting history, the relationship of one provision to the rest of
the text, historical evidence of the evils which the drafters intended to
address, construction of similar provisions by other courts-these are
all techniques which can, at least in some cases, provide clues from
which the intentions of a document's writers might be reconstructed.'I
The difficulty, of course, is that the evidence afforded by these
maxims of construction and equivalent formal interpretive techniques is
indirect and uncertain at best. They may well have had a legitimate
function as "rules of thumb" from which the drafters' intentions could
be estimated, though with questionable accuracy, in an era when courts
typically had little access to direct evidence of that intent. But if that
is their legitimate role, it appears that they should be considered to
have continuing value only so long as they elucidate, rather than con-
tradict, what is in fact known about the drafters' intentions or, as in
the State Bond Commission and American Lung Association cases, the
framers' apparent lack of intention as to particular issues.5 2 Where the
50. E.g., State ex rel. Guste, 456 So. 2d at 611-12 (Calogero, J., dissenting); Aguillard,
440 So. 2d at 711-16 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting and Watson, J., dissenting); New Orleans
Firefighters Ass'n, 422 So. 2d at 415 (Marcus, J., dissenting); City of Baton Rouge, 345
So. 2d at 41-42 (Calogero, J., dissenting); Public Housing Admin., 242 La. at 542-68,
137 So. 2d at 324-33 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting and Sanders, J., dissenting); State v.
Bradford, 242 La. 378, 141 So. 2d 378 (1962) (Summers, J., dissenting).
51. See T. Cooley, supra note 40, at 68, explaining the purpose of construction and
the maxims which guide it as "to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting"
the constitution.
52. To be sure, individual statements made by delegates to the constitutional con-
vention are no infalliable guide to the intentions of that body as a whole. See, e.g., West
v. Allen, 375 So. 2d 758, 759-60 (La. 1979) (rejecting such an argument on the ground
that various statements by different delegates could give rise to differing inferences as to
the intentions of the drafters as a whole). Nevertheless, the Louisiana courts have frequently
recognized, since the records of the 1973 convention became available, that those records
can in many cases provide a uniquely good insight into the actual understandings and
purposes of the framers of the 1974 constitution. E.g., Board of Comm'rs, 496 So. 2d
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direct evidence indicates that the drafters never considered a particular
issue, it seems futile for the court to use such techniques in order
to assume a "fictional intent" that never existed in reality. In those
circumstances, reliance on formal maxims of construction and the fic-
tional intent they reflect serves as little more than a screen behind
which the decision is reached covertly on other, non-interpretive, grounds
of public policy, -the requirements of justice and fairness in particular
cases, or other factors.
Justice Tate has persuasively argued that such concepts of policy
or justice may well provide appropriate grounds for interpretation of
ambiguous statutory provisions, particularly where the legislature's intent
is unclear or where it appears that the legislators never considered the
particular problem presented." There appears to be no inherent reason
why similar principles should not be applied to interpretation of state
constitutions, particularly in light of the tradition in this state that
statutes and the state constitution should be interpreted similarly1 4 If
at 288 (relying heavily on convention proceedings in construing the takings clause of
article I, section 4 to safeguard only private property); New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n,
422 So. 2d at 407 (relying on the convention debates and on negative inferences drawn
from the defeat of alternative formulations, including an amendment which would have
embodied the claim at bar); Board of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 347 So. 2d at
150-51 (explicit reliance on convention debates). Such arguments have not always carried
the day, however. See, e.g., Aguillard, 440 So. 2d at 715 (Watson, J., dissenting) (un-
successfully urging inference from the convention's rejection of an amendment that would
have more clearly given the legislature control over educational policy); West, 375 So. 2d
at 758; City of Baton Rouge, 345 So. 2d at 41-42 (Calogero, J., dissenting). See generally
Hargrave, supra note 41.
53. The theme is one to which Justice Tate returned several times in his published
writings. Throughout he maintained his steady commitment to the proposition that the
legislative text and intention were entitled to great respect and deference, and consistently
rejected any substitution of a judge's subjective sense of fairness for the clear command
of the lawgiver, if any such clear rule could be found. But his writings show him equally
clear that deference is owed only when the legislature has actually exercised its authority.
Judges owe no obeisance to fiction, or to the accidental wording of law by a lawgiver
who failed to consider how that wording might apply to a particular case. Where such
mere fictions were opposed to the needs of public policy or valid claims of justice and
fair play in particular cases, Justice Tate argued that judges should be willing to free
themselves from formal processes of legal reasoning and construe the law instead in the
light of good sense, justice and sound public policy. See, e.g., Tate, "Policy" in Judicial
Decisions, 20 La. L. Rev. 62 (1959); Tate, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U.L.
Rev. 250 (1975); Tate, The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial
Creativity, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 877 (1980); Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology in
Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U.L. Rev. 147 (1981). The difficulty, of course, is in de-
termining whether the lawgiver has in fact considered a particular problem or problems
of that type.
54. Though directly concerned with conflicts between "justice" and the commands
of precedents, statutes or codal materials rather than constitutions, Justice Tate's reflections
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so, decisions reached on such grounds should be explained and defended
openly by the court, not hidden behind the worn out masks of traditional
maxims of construction or other subterfuges. Such judicial forthrightness
should lead to better decisionmaking in particular cases, a more coherent
development of legal doctrine, and clearer communication between the
judiciary and those bodies-legislature, drafters of constitutional amend-
ments or voters-that enjoy the primary political authority to make or
change the law. 5
From this analysis, it appears that while the results in the State
Bond Commission and American Lung Association cases may well be
defensible-indeed, may have been mandated by the policy and equitable
considerations present-the justification which the court gave in each
case is less so. In both cases, the method of interpretation by axiom
used by the court had ceased to be a process by which the court makes
an educated guess as to what the drafters actually intended. Instead the
traditional tool was employed as a formalistic substitute for inquiry into
that intent or the analytic consequences of the lack of intent, and as
a device to avoid open discussion of other factors which appear to have
contributed more to the actual process of decision. And in one case,
the misuse of those formal methods of construction led to a decision
apparently at odds with both logic and sound public policy. 6 These
"hard cases" demonstrate the difficulties likely to ensue when fictional
"intent" is allowed to substitute for inquiry into the real thing.
CRIMINAL LAW
In two different areas, interpretation of criminal statutes and en-
forcement of criminal penalties, the Louisiana appellate courts last term
confronted claims that raised basic issues of fairness and equal protection
in the administration of the criminal laws.
Overbreadth and Equal Protection in Public Gambling
In State v. Griffin,57 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered for
the first time the constitutionality of La. R.S. 14:90.2, which prohibits
seem relevant in this context as well. Louisiana courts have long declared that the state
constitution should be interpreted by the same techniques as are statutes. See supra note
44. And the basic problem of the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking when the politically
empowered authorities-be it legislature or convention-fail to consider or to speak clearly
regarding particular problems is the same in both circumstances.
55. See Perry, supra note 39 at 293-96 for a discussion of the legitimacy of the
courts as dialectical partners of the political authorities in the law-making process.
56 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
57. 495 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1986).
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gambling in public, 58 and held that the statute was on its face neither
void for vagueness nor overbroad. This statute was enacted in 1979 as
an addition to Louisiana's long-standing criminal code provisions out-
lawing gambling conducted as a business,5 9 but seldom has been construed
since. 6° In upholding the constitutionality of the public gambling statute,
while at the same time attempting to assure Sunday golfers that side
bets on the fourteenth hole would remain decriminalized, the court may
well have created equal protection and due process problems ultimately
more difficult than those it tried to solve.
The bill of information at issue in Griffin was, to say the least,
terse, and since it was quashed by the district court and no trial was
held, the supreme court had few facts available to guide its review of
the challenged statute. All that was known was that the defendant
allegedly "intentionally gamble[d] in open view of the public in a public
parking lot."' 6' The supreme court's consideration was thus confined to
the facial validity of La. R.S. 14:90.2; no question of whether the statute
was properly applied to the particular defendant was discussed.
The Griffin court began its analysis of the statute's facial validity
with a reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the state's interest in regulating
gambling. The court's reliance on article XII, section 6 of the state
constitution as additional support for the importance of this state interest
is less than compelling in the circumstances since the convention records
58. La. R.S. 14:90.2 (1986) provides:
A. Gambling in public is the aiding or abetting or participation in any game,
contest, lottery, or contrivance, in any location or place open to the view of
the public or the people at large, such as streets, highways, vacant lots, neutral
grounds, alleyway, sidewalk, park, beach, parking lot, or condemned structures
whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit.
B. This Section shall not prohibit activities authorized under the Charitable
Raffles, Bingo and Keno Licensing Law, nor shall it apply to bona fide fairs
and festivals conducted for charitable purposes.
C. Whoever commits the crime of gambling in public shall be fined not more
than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or
both.
59. The general provision against gambling as a business, originally enacted in 1870,
is presently found at La. R.S. 14:90 (1986), which provides in relevant part:
A. Gambling is the intentional conducting, or directly assisting in the con-
ducting, as a business, of any game, contest, lottery or contrivance whereby a
person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit.
Whoever commits the crime of gambling shall be fined not more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
60. The only reported case prior to Griffin in which the interpretation of section
90.2 was at issue was the second circuit's decision in State v. Young, 457 So. 2d 205
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (held that defendants who were gambling within a laundromat
were not doing so "'n public" for purposes of the statute, even though their activities
were in fact fully visible from the street).
61. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1308.
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demonstrate that the delegates who adopted that provision were primarily
concerned with political symbolism, "commercial" gambling and pre-
venting the state from instituting a lottery, 2 issues that were not
involved in the case at bar and are dealt with elsewhere in the law.
Nevertheless, the basic proposition that the state may regulate gambling
is scarcely controversial. 63 Nor does it answer the question of whether
a blanket prohibition of gambling in any public location can comport
with the constitution.
Turning to the question of whether the statute was impermissibly
vague, the court noted that most of the challenged terms had previously
been held to be sufficiently well understood to satisfy due process in
cases and other sources involving La. R.S. 14:90, the statute outlawing
gambling "as a business." 6 The only novel term in the challenged statute
was "public," a word which the court also held to have a well understood
meaning derivable both from common usage and from prior jurisprud-
ence.65
On the final and most difficult question, whether the statute was
overbroad, the court stated as an apparent absolute that no such chal-
lenge could succeed unless the statute attempted to prohibit or regulate
an area of personal conduct which has been granted constitutional
62. Article XII, section 6 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides: "Neither the
state nor any of its political subdivisions shall conduct a lottery. Gambling shall be defined
by and suppressed by the legislature." As to the purposes for which this section was
enacted, see 9 Records, supra note 14, at 3214-15 (remarks of Delegates Avant and Smith
indicating that the proposed constitutional language would not prohibit, for example,
country club poker games, crap games at a fish fry, charitable "Las Vegas Nights,"
bingo or pari-mutuel betting, but rather is directed, in accordance with the only criminal
anti-gambling then extant, only against gambling "operated as a business"). But see id.
at 3227-28 (remarks of Delegates Kean and Gravel indicating that under the "define and
suppress" clause, the state legislature could in the future outlaw additional forms of
gambling other than the comercial variety). A more general underlying idea that such a
provision did not really belong in a constitution, but was being included to appease voters
who might take its absence as condonation of vice, appears throughout the discussion of
this section.
63. See, e.g., Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So. 2d 515 (La. 1983)
(holding that state regulation of gambling in general had a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest and thus did not violate substantive due process).
64. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1309 (relying on State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.
2d 106 (1944)), which upheld the gambling "as a business" statute, La. R.S. 14:90,
against constitutional challenge, and the Reporter's Comment to that statute).
65. In holding that the phrase "open to the view of the public or the people at
large" was sufficiently well defined and commonly understood, the court relied on prior
jurisprudence construing similar language in the state's obscenity law, State v. Muller,
365 So. 2d 464 (La. 1976), and on State v. Young, 457 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984).
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protection." Analogizing to to the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision last term in Bowers v. Hardwick,67 which upheld Georgia's anti-
sodomy statute, the Griffin court ruled that an individual has no more
constitutionally protected "right" to engage in gambling than in sodomy.
Neither right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"
nor is either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and thus
neither could support an overbreadth challenge to criminal regulation
on federal constitutional grounds. 68 Indeed, the court argued that the
gambling statute at issue in Griffin was a fortiori to Bowers since no
right to "privacy" can be implicated in regulation of "public" gambling.
Finally, the court noted that no state constitutional "right to gamble"
sufficient to justify an overbreadth attack could be inferred, since the
state constitution itself indicates hostility to gambling, directing the
legislature to define and suppress that activity. 69
Having stated these broad-reaching conclusions and upheld a statute
that on its face prohibits all public gambling of any type by anyone
anywhere, the court in Griffin pulled back, and in a curious passage
appeared to go out of its way to assure certain friendly wagerers that
they, at least, could probably continue to gamble publicly without fear:
[Ilt appears from the bill of information [that] defendant
Griffin is more similar to the player of marbles in the school
yard than the Sunday golfer. Because more social ills result from
street games than from the pastoral setting of a golf game, the
legislature may have had only the former in mind when it enacted
66. "In order for the principle of overbreadth to apply, a constitutionally protected
right must be claimed in the prosecution." Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1310 (citing State v.
Tucker, 354 So. 2d 1327 (La. 1978) and State v. Cox, 352 So. 2d 638 (La. 1977)).
67. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
68. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1310. Though the Griffin court's analysis faithfully tracks
that employed in Bowers, such a focus on whether specific activities individually enjoy
constitutional protection may well miss the point. The question of the proper level of
generality at which a constitutional provision is to be interpreted cannot be avoided. As
Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Bowers dissent, protection of individual rights under
the due process clause involves not just discrete "rights" to, for example, watch obscene
movies, place bets from telephone booths, engage in homosexual sodomy or gamble in
public. It is trivially true that the framers of neither the Federal nor the Louisiana
Constitution likely had any conscious desire to protect these specific activities-indeed,
they probably never considered them at all. Rather what is at stake in all such cases is
a more fundamental generalized "right to be left alone"-"privacy" in the sense that
there should be a sphere of private or consensual activity, which does not directly impact
on public order and in which individuals should be allowed to engage free of governmental
interference. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It may be that
criminal regulation of the public gambling at issue in Griffin would not have offended
such a "right to be let alone," but the Louisiana Supreme Court, relying on the Bowers
majority, avoided the need to make that determination.
69. But see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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La.R.S. 14:90.2, and the police may enforce it with that un-
derstanding. Nevertheless, as established above, nothing pre-
vented the legislature from concluding public gambling of any
type constitutes enough of a social ill to warrant suppressing it
as a general matter. Moreover, the possibility Georgia might
enforce its sodomy laws only against homosexuals, though the
statutory language is broad enough to also cover heterosexuals,
hardly deterred the majority of the Court in Hardwick from
rejecting the defendant's overbreadth challenge. 70
This passage is troubling for several reasons. First, the court's will-
ingness to assume without cited evidence that the legislature "may"
have had some such distinction in its collective mind when section 90.2
was adopted, and that the statute can be enforced in light of that
apparently unexpressed understanding, may render the statute, clear on
its face, impermissibly vague in its application. Moreover, it puts the
court's imprimatur on what the court apparently understands to be a
pattern of discriminatory enforcement, by which the police customarily
apply the law's full rigor to certain friendly wagerers, those who play
their games on the public streets and sidewalks, while exempting those
who do their gambling on the public fairways. This particular pattern
of selective enforcement carries with it an unfortunate odor of class
discrimination. In a world where golf course wagerers are likely to be
wealthier and whiter than their street-gambling counterparts, such a
distinction in the law may come too close to an impermissible violation
of constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
As the Griffin court recognized, a criminal statute will be held
unconstitutionally vague unless it both gives individuals of ordinary
intelligence adequate notice of what conduct is and is not forbidden,
and provides adequate standards for determination of guilt or inno-
cence v.7 And as the opinion in Griffin demonstrated, all of the terms
of section 90.2, as that statute was written, satisfy these requirements.7 2
However, by suggesting that the legislature "may" have meant something
different and more limited than what the plain terms of the statute
state, and by suggesting that the statute may permissibly be enforced
according to that understanding rather than as written, the court may
well have undermined its previous demonstration. If some kinds of public
gambling are permissible and others not, the statute must spell them
out. Otherwise a potential friendly wagerer would have no notice of
what is or is not permitted, and a court would have no articulable
standard by which to determine guilt. If the statute as written is offensive
70. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1310.
71. Id. at 1309-10.
72. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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to a sufficient number of friendly wagerers, and is enforced according
to its terms rather than some vague common understandings of the
officials, the political means for correction are available. 71
The other potential constitutional infirmities of section 90.2, as
interpreted in Griffin, inhere in the discretion which a broadly written
but irregularly enforced statute gives to officials to choose the law's
targets, and in the court's suggestion that it would be permissible for
this discretionary power to be systematically employed to distinguish
between social groups.
As Judge Rubin pointed out in Scott v. District Attorney,74 an
opinion on which the Griffin court expressly relied, 7 the evil of an
overbroad statute inheres not only in potential chilling of constitutionally
protected conduct, but also, "perhaps more ominously, [in] that it gives
enforcement officials the power to select certain citizens" for punish-
ment. 76 This discretion, unbounded by statute, can itself be a source of
constitutional infirmity. To be sure, police and prosecuting officials must
be allowed a degree of discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a
violation in a particular case, and the exercise of that discretion will
ordinarily not be subject to constitutional challenge unless it is based
upon some impermissible classification such as race. 77 But as the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court recently noted, such official discretionary power
cannot constitutionally be employed "arbitrarily, capriciously or mali-
ciously but must be used to further the ends of justice."7 s Given the
procedural framework in which the Griffin case came to the court,
posing only a facial challenge to the statute, there could be no assertion
of any arbitrary exercise of discretion in that particular case. But given
the court's express distinction between wagering on the highway and
wagering on the fairway, the question remains whether a consistent
exercise of official discretion to enforce the law against one set of
73. "I know of no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective
as their stringent execution." U.S. Grant, quoted in D. Kin, Dictionary of American
Maxims (1955). When a burdensome law is only selectively enforced against a political
minority, the political will to repeal it may never be generated, thus short circuiting the
political process on which the federal and state constitutions rely and which they are
intended to protect.
74. 309 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1970).
75. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1309.
76. Scott, 309 F. Supp. at 838.
77. E.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2205
n.9 (1979) ("the equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement 'based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification'), Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 667-68 (1978).
78. State ex rel. Guste v. K-Mart Corp., 462 So. 2d 616, 620 (La. 1985).
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wagerers but not against another would itself be arbitrary or capricious. 79
In the passage quoted above, the Griffin court tentatively justified
selective enforcement of the public gambling statute in two ways, relying
on certain unspecified "social ills" allegedly more likely to result from
gambling on the streets, and on the United States Supreme Court's
apparent acceptance of similar selective enforcement in Bowers. The first
justification suffers from the lack of any indication of what those feared
"social ills" might be, any evidence that they are sufficiently more likely
to result from one gambling tradition than another, or any demonstration
that the legislature in fact had such a distinction in mind when it enacted
section 14:90.2. Certainly the face of the statute and the official com-
ments give little support to the distinction. Bowers too provides only
limited support, since no actual threat of criminal prosecution any longer
existed in that case, and since the Bowers majority carefully avoided
considering whether the Georgia sodomy statute could be applied against
heterosexual or married couples engaging in the same acts. 80 Griffin, by
contrast, was itself a criminal action, and the court there embraced the
idea that the statute could be employed against some of those within
its literal terms, but not against others.
But on a deeper level, the Griffin court was quite correct in its
interpretation of and reliance on Bowers. That case was presented as
an appeal from dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, thus obligating
the Court to consider any possible ground on which the Georgia sodomy
statute might be held unconstitutional. 8 ' And the state's willingness to
admit that it fully intended to apply the statute only against homosexuals,
despite its facial applicability to all, surely raises the issue of the propriety
of selective enforcement of criminal statutes.82 Thus the majority's de-
cision may have to be interpreted as indicating that five justices believed
that, unless a criminal statute infringes upon a "fundamental right"-
a concept that henceforth may be very restricted in meaning-or unless
the group subjected to intentional discriminatory enforcement is a tra-
ditional "suspect class," then nothing in the United States Constitution
prohibits the authorities from enforcing a broadly worded statute only
against selected categories of individuals.
79. As the cases cited supra in note 77 show, disrimination in criminal enforcement
on a constitutionally impermissible ground is forbidden regardless of whether the burden
falls on the disfavored group as a whole or on a single individual because he is a member
of the disfavored group.
80. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841-42 n.2, 2846 n.8 (noting that, since Georgia had no
history of enforcing its sodomy laws against heterosexuals, two married plaintiffs were
dismissed as parties and that the remaining defendant did not assert an equal protection
challenge to the statute).
81. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 161-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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But this need not be the end of the inquiry. The Louisiana Con-
stitution is an independent source of rights that may limit the authorities'
discretion to selectively enforce criminal laws in this state. In light of
the state constitution's explicit directive to the legislature to define and
suppress gambling,83 the Griffin court summarily rejected the idea that
the due process article of the Louisiana Constitution might in the cir-
cumstances be interpreted to give greater substantive rights than the
federal due process clause.8 4 But the issue remains whether the implicit
message of Bowers regarding equal protection challenges to discrimi-
natory enforcement of criminal laws-that such challenges will succeed
only if the discrimination is directed against a traditional "suspect class"-
also restricts such a challenge under the equal protection article of the
state constitution.
After considerable debate, the delegates to the 1973 Louisiana con-
stitutional convention adopted an equal protection article for the state
constitution that was worded quite differently than its federal counter-
part. 5 The language eventually adopted was intended to embody the
concerns of the delegates to protect groups other than traditional racial
or religious minorities while still leaving the state government able to
make reasonable distinctions where necessary. 6
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,17 the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized that the thrust of the state constitution's equal protection
article was to provide greater protection against arbitrary discrimination
to groups which the federal courts had failed to protect, and that the
83. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
84. Griffin, 495 So. 2d at 1310. The Louisiana Constitution's guarantee of due process
is found in article I, section 2, which provides, in language virtually identical to that
found in the Federal Constitution, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, except by due process of law." There is evidence in the convention records that
the framers of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution had no intention that the state's guarantee
of due process would go beyond the federal guarantee. Records, supra note 13 at 1001
(remarks of Delegates Jack and Vick).
85. La. Const. art. I, § 3 (Right to Individual Dignity)
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
The convention debate over this provision, and how it should be worded, stretched
over two days of the convention's plenary session. Records, supra note 13, at 1016-30.
See generally, Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 La. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1974) (discussion of the article's origin and meaning).
86. Records, supra note 13, at 1029-30 (remarks of Delegate Dennery). Hargrave,
supra note 85, at 80.
87. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
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"tier" model of federal review of equal protection challenges was in-
appropriate as a guide to deciding such challenges under the state con-
stitution.8" Instead, the Sibley court announced a very different standard
of review under the state constitution's equal protection article:
Article I, Section 3 commands the courts to decline enforce-
ment of a legislative classification of individuals in three different
situations: (1) When the law classifies individuals by race or
religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely, (2) When the
statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforce-
ment shall be refused unless the state or other advocate of the
classification shows that the classification has a reasonable basis;
(3) When the law classifies individuals on any other basis, it
shall be rejected whenever a member of the disadvantaged class
shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state
interest.8 9
Measured against this test, selective enforcement of the public gam-
bling statute seems subject to challenge. Though the intended meaning
of the state constitutional prohibition of unreasonable classifications
based on "culture" is somewhat obscure, there is nothing in the con-
stitutional language to suggest that it could not be applied to the very
real cultural distinctions that separate those who do their friendly wag-
ering on the basis of skill with a golf club from those who pit instead
their skill with cards or dice. 90 Though not as unique or developed a
88. Id. at 1108.
89. Id. at 1107 (footnotes omitted).
90. As originally proposed by its drafting committee, the equal protection article did
not use the word "culture," but instead prohibited discrimination based on "social origin"
among other things. 6 Records, supra note 13, at 1016. The proponents were not very
responsive to questions from the floor regarding what "social origin" was intended to
mean. See, e.g., id. at 1018 (Delegate Roy responding to Delegate Roemer's question by
simply asserting that "social origin speaks for itself"). However, it was clear that the
delegates believed that the Louisiana provision would protect more rights than did the
Federal Constitution. E.g., id. at 1020 (remarks of Delegate Burson to the effect that
the Louisiana provision would prohibit, for example, arbitrary discrimination between new
and used car dealers).
The committee's original proposal was extensively rewritten over the night of August
29-30 to appease the concerns of various delegates that necessary and reasonable legal
distinctions might be prohibited. As rewritten, the term "social origin" was dropped and
the term "culture" was substituted as a ground on which unreasonable discrimination
was expressly forbidden. Id. at 1029 (remarks of Delegate Dennery). In response to
questions from the floor, the drafters of the rewritten article were equally unable to define
"culture." They did, however, give an example: "Culture is obvious. There can be certain
reasonable discriminations there. For instance, the English language can be the official
language of the state, and therefore, that is a reasonable discrimination against the French
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"culture" as, for example, Louisiana's French heritage, the "culture"
of inner cities or particular socio-economic groups can be seen a separate
way of life with, among other things, a distinct set of typical pastimes.
And even if such matters of popular culture or class-based differences
in style of life are not to be included in the state constitution's reference
to discrimination based on "culture," discriminatory enforcement of the
criminal laws may remain impermissible under Sibley's third category if
it does not suitably further an appropriate state interest. Though the
Griffin court did conclusorily assert that more social ills result from
one form of public gambling than the other, it is a little difficult to
see what the difference might be. Surely a public golf course is no less
public than a public street. Nor could the difference be based on a
desire to foreclose organized crime or the operation of a gambling
business, since these problems are more directly dealt with in La. R.S.
14:90. In any event, it seems that if a defendant were to mount a
challenge to the selective enforcement of the public gambling laws on
these grounds, the state would have to come forward with a greater
showing of need for the distinction than has thus far been articulated.
Jail Time in Lieu of Fines for Indigent Defendants
Last term also saw substantial judicial discussion of the question
of whether and when an indigent criminal defendant may be sentenced
to additional jail time in default of payment of a criminal fine or court
costs.
In a series of decisions over the last sixteen years, the United States
Supreme Court has held that, in some circumstances, the Federal Con-
stitution prohibits automatic imposition of additional jail terms on in-
digent criminal defendants unable to pay assessed fines or court costs.
In Williams v. Illinois,9' the Court held that such additional terms were
impermissible if they resulted in an aggregate sentence exceeding the
statutory maximum provided for the underlying crime. Morris v. Schoon-
field,92 originally set for argument with Williams, was remanded without
full opinion. But three justices, concurring, used the opportunity to
language." Id. at 1029 (remarks of Delegate Dennery).
As indicated by reference to the French language, it may have been that the delegates
apparently understood the reference to "culture" in the equal protection article as a
specific protection for Louisiana's French heritage. Hargrave, supra note 85, at 9. But
the language they adopted and the voters ratified cannot easily be given so restrictive a
meaning. The language is subject to a broader construction, one that would protect from
unreasonable discrimination the varied lifestyles of all of the state's residents. The framers
intended to draft and adopt a broad provision, one that would extend protection beyond
the federal guarantee. Id. at 6.
91. 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970).
92. 399 U.S. 508, 90 S. Ct. 2232 (1970).
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reiterate that in their view the principles of Williams prevented any
automatic conversion of a fine into additional jail time if the reason
for nonpayment was the defendant's inability to do so." In Tate v.
Short,94 the Court held that default incarceration of indigents was un-
constituional if the underlying crime was punishable only by fine. And
in Bearden v. Georgia,95 the Court ruled that inability to pay restitution
and fines could not be grounds for automatic revocation of parole.
However, the Court in each case resisted generalization of the principle.
Where the predicate criminal law authorizes jail as a sanction and where
the aggregate sentence including default time is below the statutory
maximum, the United States Supreme Court has thus far refused to
hold that sentencing judges may never sentence indigents as well as
wealthier individuals to jail if they fail to pay criminal fines or court
costs.
Until 1986, the law of Louisiana on this issue was well settled.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 884 not only permitted
but commanded that in all serious cases a criminal sentence including
a fine or costs "shall provide" for additional imprisonment for up to
one year if the defendant fails to pay the fine or costs assessed. 96 No
statutory exception for indigents exists. While it was recognized that
imposition of additional time in lieu of payment of an indigent would
be constitutionally impermissible if it would result in a total sentence
exceeding the statutory maximum, 97 and that in egregious cases a sub-
stantial fine could amount to an excessive punishment if imposed on
one lacking any ability to pay that fine,9 no general rule limited the
discretion of a sentencing court to impose such penalties on indigents.
93. Id. (White, J., concurring) (joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
94. 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971).
95. 461 U.S. 660, 103. S. Ct. 2064 (1983).
96. La. Code Crim. P. art. 884 (1984) provides:
If a sentence imposed includes a fine or costs, the sentence shall provide that
in default of payment thereof the defendant shall be imprisoned for a specified
period not to exceed one year; provided that where the maximum prison sentence
which may be imposed as a penalty for a misdemeanor is six months or less,
the total period of imprisonment upon conviction of the offense, including
imprisonment for default in payment of fine or costs, shall not exceed six
months for that offense.
97. E.g., State v. Coon, 475 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
98. E.g., State v. Perry, 472 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (a fine of $5,000
and default term of one year, imposed in addition to a basic term of four years at hard
labor on an indigent convicted of a single count of attempted distribution of a counterfeit
controlled substance, held excessive; fine and default term vactated); State v. LaGrange,
471 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (indigent pleaded guilty to one count of
distribution of marijuana, sentenced to a fine of $7,500 with a default term of one year,
in addition to a basic term of six years at hard labor; fine and default term vacated as
excessive).
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In three 1986 rulings, State v. Williams,99 State v. Garrett,'°° and
State v. Pinkney, °'0 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed convictions
but amended the sentences to delete provisions imposing additional jail
terms in lieu of payment of fines or costs. Though these rulings were
delivered without opinion, the court made clear the essence of its concern
in each case by citing Williams v. Illinois, Morris v. Schoonfield, Tate
v. Short and Beardon v. Georgia. None of the cases confronted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court- appeared to include any of the special cir-
cumstances present in the United States Supreme Court cases cited. In
each, the predicate criminal statute permitted incarceration, the total
sentence imposed was within statutory limits and no question of parole
was raised. Thus by amending the sentences in the three cases before
them, the Louisiana Supreme Court could be understood to be an-
nouncing, cryptically but effectively, a new more general rule forbidding
the imposition of default jail terms on indigents in virtually all circum-
stances. Since these decisions were without opinion, however, it has been
left to the lower courts to work out the implications of this new
dispensation.
The fourth judicial circuit appears to have been the earliest and
most enthusiastic exponent of a generaliized prohibition of default in-
carceration of indigents. In State v. Williams'0 2 that court overturned a
sentence of three years in prison and a $1,000 fine in default of which
an additional six months would be served, imposed upon an individual
guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Though the
defendant was represented by private counsel at trial, he was adjudged
an indigent and provided with appointed counsel on appeal. After re-
viewing the federal precedents, and drawing "support" from the writs
granted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams and Garrett, the
Williams court held that subjecting any indigent to a longer period of
incarceration than he would have faced if he had been able to pay a
fine violates his rights under the equal protection and due process clauses
of the federal and state constitutions. 103 The court also held, alternatively,
that imposition of the default term on an indigent constitutes excessive
punishment.' °4 The court in Williams was undeterred by the fact that
the default had not yet occurred, and apparently required no greater
proof of inability to pay the fine than the fact that the defendant had
been defended by the public defender on appeal.
99. 484 So. 2d 662 (La. 1986).
100. 484 So. 2d 662 (La. 1986).
101. 488 So. 2d 682 (La. 1986).
102. 489 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 291-92.
104. Id. at 293.
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In subsequent cases, the fourth circuit reaffirmed and extended the
Williams rule to preclude incarceration in default of payment of court
costs as well as fines, and to default terms as short as thirty days. 05
While the court initially rested its results on grounds of excessiveness
as well, the later cases appear to rely solely upon an equal protection
rationale.10 6 In all of these cases, the fourth circuit appears willing to
accept the fact of appointment of counsel, without more, as proof not
only of inability to pay fines or costs but also of the inappropriateness
of imposing any penalty in addition to the basic jail term, in lieu of
lump sum payment of the fine.1
0 7
The first circuit, in contrast, has been less enthusiastic. In State v.
Bohanna'08 the court argued that a per se rule that indigents could never
be incarcerated for failure to pay fines was neither mandated by federal
precedent nor good policy, since it might well lead trial judges to impose
longer fixed terms on indigents in lieu of now unenforceable fines. But
the court reluctantly agreed that such a course was required by the
Louisiana Supreme Court's actions in Williams, Garrett and Pinkney,
and vacated a sentence of $6,000 or an additional jail term of twelve
months at hard labor imposed, in addition to a basic term of five years
hard labor, on an indigent convicted of one count each of marijuana
and cocaine distribution.
Though the third circuit appears not to have directly confronted
these issues in the last term, its recent decisions illustrate yet a different
approach. In State v. White,' °9 the apparently indigent defendant was
105. State v. Jones, 492 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (vacating fine of $1000
and default term of thirty days); State v. Jackson, 492 So. 2d 1265 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1986) (vacating imposition of costs in the amount of $74 and default term of thirty days);
State v. Barnes, 495 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (vacating costs of $24 and
default term of thirty days); State v. Barnes, 496 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986)
(vacating costs of $74 and default term of thirty days); State v. Ellzey, 496 So. 2d 1090
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (vacating costs of $80 and default term of thirty days).
106. Compare, State v. Jackson, 492 So. 2d 1265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (relying
alternatively on an excessiveness rationale) with, e.g., Barnes, 496 So. 2d at 1059 (justifying
vacature solely on due process and equal protection grounds).
107. In Jackson, 492 So. 2d at 1267, the fourth circuit did imply that the legality of
the imposition of a fine and default jail term on an indigent would turn, in light of the
United States Supreme Court precedents, on whether the additional jail time had been
imposed "automatically" or rather whether the sentencing court had considered the par-
ticular individual's ability to pay and the propriety of other sanctions. If followed, this
line of reasoning would lead not to a per se rule forbidding imposition of such sanctions
on indigents but rather to a requirement of individualized hearings similar to those proposed
by the second circuit in State v. Lewis, 506 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987). However,
despite this discussion, the court in Jackson in effect applied a per se rule, simply vacating
the fine and default term imposed rather than remanding the case fu, further individualized
consideration of these factors.
108. 491 So. 2d 756, 758-60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
109. 476 So. 2d 1162, 1168-69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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sentenced by the trial court to a term of four years at hard labor, a
fine of $5,000 and a default jail term of an additional year, all on a
guilty plea to a single count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana.
Though acknowleging that a court cannot impose a fine as part of
sentence and then automatically convert that fine into an additional jail
term solely because of the defendant's inability to pay, the court based
its decision overturning the default jail term upon its prior jurisprudence
regarding excessive verdicts. The court thus avoided any per se rule of
due process or equal protection, and focused instead upon the facts
presented. It concluded there, as it had several times previously, that
imposition of a substantial fine was excessive in light of all the facts,
including the defendant's manifest inability to pay.110
The second circuit initially simply echoed the first circuit in unhappy
resignation to what it took to be the Louisiana Supreme Court's new
per se rule."' However, in its most recent decision on this issue, State
v. Lewis, 2 the second circuit reexamined the state and federal supreme
court decisions. On reconsideration it concluded that neither absolutely
prohibited imposition of an additional jail sentence on indigents in all
circumstances when they fail to pay a fine or costs. Rather, it concluded
the state supreme court's cases give no-guidance as to whether the rule
should be applied per se and the federal precedents preclude only au-
tomatic imposition of such additional incarceration. The Lewis court
proposed yet another approach ruling that henceforth, where a defendant
fails to pay an assessed fine or costs and pleads inability to do so, the
trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant
has made a good faith effort to pay and, if so, whether alternative
sanctions such as installment payments or community service work would
be appropriate in lieu of lump sum payment. If the sentencing court
concludes that the defendant has failed to make a good faith effort or
if other sanctions are determined to be insufficient, additional jail time
may be imposed in default of payment, even if the defendant is unable
to pay because of indigency." 3
110. Id. at 1168-69. See also, to the same effect, State v. Jones, 475 So. 2d 917, 918
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (holding that financial ability of a defendant to pay must be
specifically considered, along with other statutorily mandated sentencing guidelines, in
setting any criminal fine).
Ill. This circuit apparently considered the impact of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
actions in Williams, Garrett and Pinkney for the first time in State v. Roye, 501 So. 2d
916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987). Though it vacated fines of $5,000 and $500, with repective
default terms of one year and sixty days on the indigent defendant, the court's unhappiness
with what it perceived as a per se rule was plain from the opinion, which spoke repeatedly
of how it was "compelled" and "bound" to follow the supreme court's apparent lead.
112. 506 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 564-65, granting the writ to the extent that
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The Louisiana Supreme Court's reticence and the variation in ap-
proaches taken by the circuit courts leave several questions without
definitive answers. The first is the question of where in the federal and
state constitutions this protection is rooted. Does it arise at the interface
of the guarantees of equal protection and due process or is it more
properly considered as an aspect of the prohobitions against excessive
punishments? An inquiry based on equal protection or due process
concepts would focus the court's attention on the rationality or, con-
versely, the arbitrariness of the decision to in effect impose an extra
term of incarceration on an indigent while a wealthier defendant is
allowed to substitute payment of a sum of money. Among the relevant
considerations would be whether in the particular case an additional jail
term or other sanction is needed to fulfill the same penological purpose
that a fine serves when imposed on a defendant with assets. Also relevant
would be the reverse discrimination that might result if indigent defend-
ants were regularly forgiven a portion of the sanctions uniformly imposed
on others. Conversely, if the rule is seen as rooted in prohibitions
against excessive punishment, such comparative measures would seem
much less important. Instead the inquiry would focus on whether the
amount of the fine imposed is disproportionate to the assets of the
defendant and perhaps whether the sentence as a whole-jail term and
fine, or jail term and additional default term-is disproportionate to
the Crime committed.
Though both the excessive punishment and the equal protection/
due process rationals have utility, the latter would seem to provide a
preferable foundation for the rule. Certainly, such a foundation is
implicit in those rulings overturning imposition of even modest court
costs on indigents. It is difficult to conceive that many defendants would
be so utterly without resources as to render costs of $50 or $75 either
beyond reach or disproportionate to the crime charged. And such a
determination would seem to require a much greater showing of des-
titution than the mere fact that the defendant qualifies, for appointed
counsel. More importantly, only by basing this rule in such concepts
of equal protection and due process can the court give sufficient attention
if within the prescribed time defendant does not pay his fine and pleads inability
to do so, the sentencing court shall hold a hearing to inquire into the reasons
for failure to pay. If defendant willfully refused to pay or failed to make
sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the trial
court may order execution of the jail sentences. If the defendant could not pay
his fine despite sufficient bona fide efforts ... the trial court must consider
alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if the al-
ternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment
and deterrence, for reasons articulated by the trial judge, may the trial court
order execution of the jail sentences.
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to what appears to be the central motivation behind all of these decisions,
a fundamental perception that the severity of actual punishment should
not depend on accidental factors unrelated to the crime, such as the
defendant's wealth or poverty.
If the proper focus is thus on equalization of sanctions across
economic disparities, then the second circuit's refusal to automatically
amend sentences to delete fines imposed on the indigent, and its mandate
that trial courts should consider alternative sanctions in place of un-
payable fines, seem entirely proper. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized in dictum, it would be as inequitable and arbitrary to
exempt the indigent from a sanction, the fine, to which the rest of the
population is subject as it would be to subject him to an additional
penalty in the form of default incarceration.' 1 4 Thus a sentencing court
faced with a plea of inability to pay a fine should be required to
consider other equivalent sanctions such as deferred or installment pay-
ments or community service work. Here, the need for equity would
seem to clearly outweigh the cost of any hearing required to make such
a determination. The hardest question for the future will be whether
circumstances can ever arise which would justify additional jail time
when a defendant cannot pay a fine despite bona fide attempts. This
awaits another day.
The final set of open issues is essentially procedural; whether inability
to pay costs or fines should be presumed from the fact that a defendant
qualifies for appointed counsel or whether a separate hearing should be
held to determine the ability and efforts of the defendant to pay. Here,
too, the second circuit's willingness to engage in case by case deter-
mination seems justified. The number of cases and consequent burden
on the court would not appear to be great. And the correlation between
qualification for appointed counsel and inability to pay costs or fines,
on which the fourth circuit's per se rule evidently depends, is scarcely
exact. Such a presumption can be both underinclusive, missing those
who exhaust their resources on private counsel, and overinclusive, ex-
empting defendants who, though poor enough to qualify for a public
defender, nevertheless have the resources to pay reasonable costs or a
moderate fine. Equity and avoidance of arbitrary sentencing require no
less.
114. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970).
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